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This chapter looks at two sets of prudential issues of relevance to Latin America and the 
Caribbean (LAC). The first set analyses the implications of foreign bank entry. Building on 
the work of Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001), it addresses four specific issues pertaining to 
such entry. First, it looks at the various forms of foreign bank entry and the implications that 
this has for banking supervision. Second, it considers whether market consolidation 
resulting from foreign bank entry poses new risks for systemic stability. Third, it analyses 
the impact of foreign bank entry on market transparency. Fourth, it discusses whether 
foreign banks should be incorporated into lender of last resort schemes and official safety 
nets. The second set is related to the planned implementation of Basel II. It discusses 
some of the concerns raised by supervisors in implementing the new framework in 
emerging market economies (EMEs). It also looks at the potential impact of Basel II on 
international bank lending to EMEs.  
Graph 4.1 
BIS reporting banks’ foreign claims on emerging markets 
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1  Claims on local residents denominated in local currencies and booked by reporting banks’ local affiliates.    
2  In 
billions of US dollars.    
3  Cross-border claims in all currencies plus claims on local residents denominated in 
foreign currencies and booked by reporting banks’ local affiliates.    
4  Local claims as a percentage of foreign 
claims. 
Source: BIS International Banking Statistics. 
                                                  
1  The author is grateful to Angus Butler, Juan Carlos Crisanto, Mar Gudmundsson, Steven Friedman, Gregor 
Heinrich, Jeffrey Miller, Dubravko Mihaljek, Ramon Moreno and Camilo Tovar for extensive comments. The 
views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision or the Bank for International Settlements.  
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 Foreign banks and supervision 
An important trend in EMEs has been the growing participation of foreign banks in domestic 
banking markets (Moreno and Villar (2005)). As shown on Graph 4.1, such an evolution has 
been particularly evident in Latin America, where heavy foreign investment in local entities 
has been followed by a rapid increase in local lending in local currency. This expansion of 
local lending has been a positive development for systemic stability to the extent that it has 
helped reduce currency mismatches. Greater foreign penetration has also contributed to 
improving the efficiency of financial intermediation. However, greater foreign participation in 
domestic markets has also raised questions concerning financial stability and supervision.  
Licensing and supervision of foreign banks 
The entry of foreign banks has brought to the fore the issue of whether such banks should be 
licensed as branches or subsidiaries. In this respect, country practices vary considerably 
across the region (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 
Approaches for foreign bank entry,  
selected countries in Latin America 
Subsidiary or branch  Subsidiary  Branch 
Argentina Costa  Rica  Guatemala 
Aruba Mexico  Paraguay 
Bahamas    
Bolivia    
Brazil    
Chile    
Colombia    
Ecuador    
El Salvador     
Peru    
Venezuela    
Source: IADB (2004). 
 
Some countries tend to favour branches because of a number of perceived advantages. 
Branches do not have to be separately capitalised; they are less likely to engage in 
connected lending; they are subject to consolidated oversight by home country supervisors; 
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 and they are more likely to obtain support from parents.
2 However, branches also face some 
drawbacks. A significant weakness is that they are often restricted in their operations. Such 
restrictions usually take the following forms: constraints on domestic deposit taking, limits on 
expansion and requirements for some capital to be held in the domestic market in the form of 
so-called “endowment” capital. An additional drawback is that branches are more difficult to 
sell to third parties when problems of solvency arise. 
By contrast, other countries favour subsidiaries because they are perceived to be easier to 
supervise and manage in periods of distress. In general, subsidiaries are regulated by host 
country authorities as legally separate entities and, hence, require their own capital within the 
host country.
3 This structure in principle makes the foreign bank more accountable to host 
country supervisors. To ensure that parent institutions stand behind their subsidiaries, host 
country supervisors often ask parent banks (and sometimes parent country supervisors) to 
provide “comfort letters”. Even without such measures, parent banks monitor the activities of 
their subsidiaries closely in order to ensure the solidity of their operations and forestall any 
difficulties that could damage their good name. The incentive to monitor the activities of 
subsidiaries is strengthened by the fact that the courts can at times hold the parents liable in 
the event of difficulties.  
Some argue that, given the more open nature of financial systems, the issue of branches 
versus subsidiaries may be less relevant. What matters most in practice is that, regardless of 
the legal form of their presence, foreign banks be initially licensed to carry out those activities 
that host country supervisors are familiar with and able to monitor properly. At the same time, 
licensing rules should be reasonably flexible and supervisors should continuously upgrade 
their capacity to monitor banks’ activities. 
Supervisory authorities in banking systems dominated by foreign-owned banks have sought 
to cooperate more closely with home country authorities. In many cases, formal channels of 
communication have been established with the framework for cooperation set out in bilateral 
memoranda of understanding.
4 Yet some central banks have expressed scepticism about 
overly legalistic modes of communication among supervisors. Moreover, some host country 
authorities have not always been fully informed about the domestic implications of operations 
at the global level (eg how global risk management could affect a domestic operation) or the 
situation of parent banks in home countries. One issue that arises is what would happen if a 
systemically important foreign-owned subsidiary ran into problems. There have been cases 
where a parent company has helped its subsidiary immediately without asking host country 
authorities for assistance. But there have also been some cases of parents abandoning their 
subsidiaries. This was the case in Argentina in 2002, where a few foreign banks explicitly 
abandoned their Argentine branches or subsidiaries (Del Negro and Kay (2002) and Lacoste 
(2005)).  
An important consideration in LAC is the extent to which the existence of poorly regulated or 
unregulated offshore financial institutions (OFIs) presents a potential risk to the financial 
systems in which they operate (Singh et al (2005)). In some countries, particularly in Central 
                                                  
2   Under Basel II, branches of banks incorporated in highly rated countries will be able to obtain cheaper funding 
because they will be subject to lower capital weights than subsidiaries incorporated in host countries that are 
lower-rated. 
3  Although they are also regulated by home country authorities that practice consolidated supervision. 
4  Areas of cooperation typically cover: exchange of information on operations of foreign-owned banks in host 
and home countries; exchange of information on management of foreign-owned banks; joint consultations; 
and visits to foreign-owned banks. In spite of the development of these forms of cooperation, the 
establishment of a closer working relationship has been complicated by the different legal treatment of 
confidential data and information in various jurisdictions. 
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 America, non-regulated OFIs operate effectively as parallel banking structures that are part 
of larger financial entities. These entities may increase systemic vulnerability by exploiting 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities, such as the dumping of impaired assets from regulated to 
non-regulated entities. Focusing only on the regulated bank could lead to erroneous 
conclusions about the risk exposure of the banking system. The problem may be 
exacerbated if a regulator is not aware of the links between a regulated and an unregulated 
financial entity or does not have the legal capacity to supervise one of them. In Ecuador, for 
instance, the banking crisis of 1998-99 was exacerbated by the fact that apparently sound 
onshore banks turned out to be much weaker than expected when supervisors audited their 
closely linked but poorly regulated OFIs. 
In order to minimise the risks associated with OFIs, supervisors in the region have sought to 
impose conditions or restrictions on them to facilitate more adequate supervision. A number 
of jurisdictions have legislation that allows supervisors to refuse authorisation to banks with 
corporate structures that cannot be supervised. For example, in Brazil and Panama banks 
will in general not be granted licences if they are chartered in jurisdictions where local 
supervisors are not able to perform consolidated supervision. In Guatemala, where OFIs 
account for 30% of private banking activity, new regulations introduced in 2002 prohibit the 
operations of OFIs not formally associated with locally licensed financial conglomerates. 
There has also been growing recourse to consolidated supervision. For example, the 
Brazilian and Salvadorean authorities are now conducting consolidated supervision of their 
banks. To further strengthen the supervision of parallel banking structures operating in 
several jurisdictions, it may be necessary to appoint a lead supervisor to deal with 
multinational entities on a consolidated basis.  
Market transparency and discipline 
The acquisition and subsequent delisting of subsidiaries on local stock exchanges can 
adversely affect the quality of financial information available to market participants and host 
country supervisors (CGFS (2004) and Domanski (2005)). For one, delisting dilutes the 
available pricing signals on the profitability of domestic banking business. Another effect is 
that local financial analysts usually abandon their coverage of banks that become foreign 
subsidiaries. As local analysts may have an informational advantage over their international 
counterparties, this may diminish the quality of available information.
5  
As an example, delisting has been a major issue in Mexico. During 2000-05, five of the 
largest institutions in that country, representing almost 80% of total bank assets, were 
acquired by foreign-owned banks. All of these five institutions were subsequently delisted 
from the Mexican stock exchange. As these banks represented 15% of total stock market 
capitalisation at the time of acquisition, their delisting led to a considerable loss of market 
information and scrutiny by independent analysts.
6 The disclosure of timely and meaningful 
information about developments in institutions accounting for much of Mexico’s banking 
sector was impaired, making it necessary to significantly improve information flows from 
parent banks to markets and from home supervisors to host authorities.  
                                                  
5  Information requested by supervisors can to some degree substitute for information provided by markets.  
6  Domanski (2005) also notes that after the foreign acquisition of Mexico’s two largest banks, the correlation of 
the prices of the remaining domestic banks and newly acquired banks dropped significantly, which is 
consistent with the view that the share price of foreign-owned banks reflects less information about domestic 
financial conditions. 
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 Market concentration  
Consolidation resulting partly from foreign bank entry has been associated with a sharp 
increase in market concentration since the early 1990s (see Chapter I). Many countries follow 
policies that limit concentration but views differ as to what should be the maximum desirable 
market share for a single bank or a small group of banks. The issue of market power appears 
to have been less of a concern in small open economies, perhaps because collusion is more 
difficult to maintain in such economies. Moreover, there may be some intrinsic advantages in 
allowing the formation of larger banking groups. Larger banks can benefit from economies of 
scale, are better able to diversify their activities and can deploy superior risk management 
techniques.  
Nevertheless, mergers between foreign parent institutions have led to a lively debate in some 
host countries because of concerns that the larger entities would result in greater systemic 
risk. In Chile, for example, the merger of the Spanish parent banks of two domestic banks led 
to the single ownership of nearly 30% of banking system assets. Although the two Chilean 
entities continued to be run and managed separately after the merger, many in the industry 
were concerned that the newly acquired institutions had become too big to fail and asked 
themselves whether their large presence in the banking system posed systemic risks. The 
Chilean authorities responded to those concerns by requiring banks exceeding a market 
share of 20% to meet higher capital adequacy and liquidity ratios and to reduce their 
exposure to the interbank market. To increase competition, new bank licenses were issued 
and banks were allowed to offer interest on deposit accounts. Chilean companies were also 
allowed to borrow on international capital markets.  
Another concern is that changes in business strategy or risk appetite at the parent level could 
affect the resources allocated to specific countries. Global financial institutions increasingly 
manage their affiliates in emerging market countries as part of portfolios that respond to 
evolving risk-adjusted investment criteria. Changes in credit allocation across countries, 
which may even include a complete retrenchment of activities from a given country, could 
have a significant impact on the availability of credit in a host country, particularly if the 
foreign ownership of domestic claims is relatively important. Foreign ownership, therefore, 
exposes local banking systems more directly to changes in global market conditions.  
Official safety nets 
An important supervisory issue is to determine whether depositors in foreign banks should 
receive the same degree of protection as depositors in domestic banks. Some have argued 
that because foreign banks have the backing of their parents, they may not require lender of 
last resort arrangements nor participate in deposit insurance schemes. Arrangements giving 
depositors priority in the event of the winding up of a foreign bank or empowering the central 
bank to take over an impaired foreign bank may be hard to apply in practice.  
Moreover, a strong argument in favour of extending deposit insurance to all banks is that all 
depositors should receive the same degree of protection. If foreign banks did not have to pay 
deposit insurance premia, they would enjoy an unfair advantage over domestic banks and 
therefore have an incentive to finance riskier activities with deposits collected in the host 
country. In practice, virtually all EMEs require foreign banks to participate in deposit 
protection arrangements on the same basis as domestic banks (see Table A15). 
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 Prudential policies and Basel Core Principles 
Many EMEs have taken steps in recent years to enhance banking regulation and supervision 
and a number have already developed sophisticated approaches to monitoring their banking 
systems. However, in some countries improvements in the regulatory environment have 
been limited. Recent assessments under the International Monetary Fund/World Bank 
Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAPs), which focus in part on progress in 
implementing the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCPs), suggest 
that significant weaknesses in banking supervision remain in a number of EMEs.
7 Three 
issues may be cited:  
The first is the absence of effective consolidated supervision in some countries. This is 
thought to be of particular relevance in Central America, where reportedly few countries have 
implemented it yet (ASBA (2006)). This increases the risk that subsidiaries of banking 
institutions could experience financial difficulties which are not readily detectable, adversely 
affecting the financial sector and the economy.  
Graph 4.2 













1  In per cent.    
2 Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.  
Sources: IMF; BIS calculations. 
A second issue is the measurement of bank performance and capital adequacy. Most 
countries in LAC claim that their banks calculate capital requirements on the basis of the 
current Basel Accord methodology (IADB (2004)). The general focus on Basel I, as well as 
efforts to address the BCPs, apparently have had a positive impact on capital adequacy 
ratios across the region (see Graph 4.2 and Table A16) and promoted the development of 
better risk management methodologies. However, such ratios can give a misleading picture 
of risks to the financial system. For example, capital adequacy ratios are sometimes not 
calculated on a consolidated basis and risk weightings are inadequate because of a lack of 
appropriate measurement.  
A third concern has to do with deficiencies in risk management. Many countries have not 
succeeded in instilling a culture of risk management in banking institutions and, thus, 
compliance with banking regulations tends to be largely mechanical. By the same token, 
                                                  
7  The BCPs, which were introduced in 1997, are mainly intended to help countries assess the quality of their 
prudential and supervisory systems, and to support supervisory reform. An updated document was released in 
October 2006 (BCBS (2006a)).  
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 regulations on large credit exposures and on connected lending are not seen as being strict 
enough. This is an issue of particular concern in Central America. In some countries, such as 
Chile and Panama, there is also insufficient attention to market risk. In addition, banks in 
many countries have made great strides recently in implementing robust frameworks for 
managing operational risk but this is not universally the case due to resource constraints that 
have forced them to focus first on enhancing their management of credit risk.  
Remedial supervisory measures are also commonly deficient, reducing the incentives for 
diligent risk management. Such deficiencies include undue forbearance,
8 lack of supervisory 
capacity or authority for timely intervention, and lack of reasonable protection against legal 
action. While there have been improvements in bankruptcy legislation in some countries 
problems in enforcing creditor rights remain significant (see Arrieta and Luy (2002)).  
Compliance with the main guidelines contained in the BCPs would do much to address most 
of these weaknesses. The BCBS has stated that one of the key conditions for a successful 
implementation of Basel II will be compliance with the BCPs (see BCBS (2006a,b)). In fact, 
some countries, would benefit from devoting scarce resources to ensuring their compliance 
with the BCPs first, in particular in the areas of consolidated supervision and capital 
adequacy calculations, before turning their attention to implementing Basel II.  
A snapshot of Basel II  
Basel II consists of three mutually reinforcing pillars: Pillar 1, regulatory capital requirements; 
Pillar 2, the supervisory review process; and Pillar 3, market discipline. 
The new framework will allow for a more risk sensitive determination of capital requirements. 
For credit risk, the various alternatives include: the standardised approach, which relies on 
external credit assessments for determining credit risk weights, and the foundation internal 
ratings-based (IRB) and advanced IRB approaches, which rely to varying degrees on banks’ 
own internal rating systems and estimates of underlying risk parameters. The framework also 
contains options regarding risk mitigation techniques and securitisation. In addition, there will 
be an explicit capital charge for operational risk which will be based on three alternative 
measurement methods. Countries will have to decide whether to stay with the current 
framework or move to Basel II, which will require banks to adopt one of the available options 
for credit and operational risks.  
In order for required capital adequacy ratios to truly reflect the capacity of the banking 
system to absorb shocks, other elements of the prudential and supervisory framework will 
need to be strengthened. This is why a successful implementation of the first pillar of Basel II 
will require the parallel introduction of the other two pillars. The introduction of Pillar 2 aims at 
ensuring that banks have an adequate process for the assessment of their overall capital 
adequacy in relation to their risk profile and risk management strategy, and that supervisors 
have a robust framework for assessing banks’ internal processes. Pillar 3 contains a set of 
disclosure requirements that will promote market discipline by allowing market participants to 
assess key pieces of information related to Pillars 1 and 2. 
                                                  
8  The willingness of regulators to postpone action when certain thresholds are breached.  
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 Planned implementation of Basel II in EMEs 
In 2004 and 2006, the Financial Stability Institute (FSI) conducted surveys on implementation 
of Basel II in non-BCBS member countries (see FSI (2004 and 2006)). The objective of the 
surveys was to identify Basel II implementation plans and determine corresponding capacity 
building needs in the non-BCBS supervisory community. In the most recent survey, 82 non-
BCBS jurisdictions responded that they would adopt Basel II between 2007 and 2009. Taking 
into account the 13 BCBS member countries, close to 100 countries worldwide could 
therefore be implementing Basel II over the next few years. 
Table 4.2 
Adoption of Basel II  






adopt Basel II 
Percentage 
Asia    18   16   16    100 
Africa    25   17   12    71 
Latin  America    16   14   12    86 
Caribbean    8   7   4    57 
Middle  East    9   8   8    100 
No-BCBS  Europe   39   36   30    83 
Total    115   98   82    84 
Source: FSI (2006). 
 
According to the FSI surveys, one of the major drivers in moving to Basel II in non-BCBS 
jurisdictions is the intended local implementation of this framework by foreign controlled 
banks or local branches of foreign banks. This is particularly the case in non-BCBS Europe, 
the Middle East and Latin America, where in the latter case foreign institutions hold roughly a 
third of banking assets expected to be moving to Basel II. The role of foreign players is also 
important in the Caribbean, where foreign owned or controlled financial institutions account 
for a large share of banking assets in some countries.   
The  surveys revealed that Basel II was set to apply to approximately 95% of banking assets 
in Latin America but to a lesser 25% of such assets in the Caribbean.
9 However, the 
implementation of Pillar 1 in the region shows some variation. In the case of Latin American 
countries, banks controlling close to 50% of banking assets intend to apply the foundation 
IRB approach between 2007 and 2009. During the same period, banks controlling a third of 
bank assets plan on implementing the simplified standardised approach. In the Caribbean, 
banks controlling a majority of banking assets intend to apply the simplified standardised 
approach between 2007 and 2009, although a few responding countries indicated that some 
of their banks would also implement the advanced IRB approach. It should be noted, 
                                                  
9  However, the FSI noted that if the country with the largest banking system in the region was removed, the 
amount of assets covered by the new framework would increase to close to 100%.   
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 however, that anecdotal reports gathered by the BCBS indicate that progress in 
implementing Basel II may be slower than suggested by the responses to the FSI surveys.  
With respect to Pillar 2, the FSI surveys highlight that Basel II will necessitate the existence 
of a solid supervisory infrastructure, including operational autonomy of the supervisory 
authority, an adequate supply of resources for supervision, clearly defined normative and 
disciplinary competences and an adequate legal framework. At the same time, solid 
accounting standards will be required to ensure that capital ratios accurately reflect a bank’s 
capacity to absorb risk. One of the particular challenges highlighted in the FSI surveys in the 
implementation of Pillar 2 relates to acquiring and upgrading the human and technical 
resources necessary for the review of banks’ responsibilities under Pillar 1.
10 An additional 
challenge is coordination by home and host supervisors in the cross-border implementation 
of Basel II. The freedom of national supervisors to conduct a tailoring of rules to the specific 
circumstances of each country will prevent the implementation of fully consistent rules across 
countries. Efforts will therefore be required to reduce such inconsistencies.
11 Concerning 
Pillar 3, the development of financial indicators that would ensure a proper functioning of 
market discipline also depends on compliance with the BCPs. A significant challenge 
identified by the FSI surveys will be to align supervisory disclosures with international 
accounting standards.  
Appropriateness of Basel II for EMEs 
Beyond the practical issues related to the implementation of Basel II, the broader question of 
the extent to which the new framework is appropriate for EMEs remains. One of the key 
issues is whether risk weights taken from a framework designed by industrialised countries 
can be successfully adapted to economies that differ in their economic structure and are 
generally more vulnerable to financial shocks (Goldstein (1997)). Prima facie, there would be 
a case for banks in emerging economies to hold greater capital if there is greater risk of loss, 
associated for example with greater macroeconomic volatility and a greater incidence of 
macroeconomic or financial disruptions (Villar (2006)). Several countries have already 
adjusted the Basel I framework to account for their specific needs. A number of countries 
have imposed higher capital adequacy ratios on their banks than the mandated minimum or 
have adapted their risk-weights for different categories of assets.  
Basel II and lending to EMEs 
The introduction of the new capital framework constitutes an important topic of discussion 
concerning the evolution of international bank lending to EMEs over the next few years. As 
noted above, an important objective of Basel II is to ensure that the regulatory capital held by 
international banks becomes a more accurate reflection of the credit quality of their loan 
portfolios. Some commentators (Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001) among others) have argued 
that this increased risk sensitivity will lead to a curtailment in the supply of capital to EMEs.  
                                                  
10  In response, the FSI introduced a new online training facility (“FSI Connect”).  
11  Supervisors of the BCBS member countries have worked closely through the Accord Implementation Group 
(AIG) to achieve a high degree of consistency. Members of the AIG have also worked with supervisors of the 
non-BCBS countries through the Core Principles Liaison Group (CPLG) to share information and points of 
view concerning implementation in non-BCBS countries. 
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 However, there are reasons to think that Basel II will not have the dramatic impact that these 
commentators have suggested. The main one is that banks do not price their loans on the 
basis of regulatory capital charges but rather on the basis of economic capital, which is the 
capital set aside as a buffer against unexpected losses (Hayes and Saporta (2002)). This 
economic capital is linked to the credit quality of bank assets. In turn, the level and cost of 
economic capital determine the pricing of bank loans and other assets. In practice, the level 
of economic capital should not be directly affected by a change in regulatory capital 
requirements. In fact, Basel II intends to align the determination of regulatory capital more 
closely with the methods used to determine economic capital. This should mean that the 
introduction of Basel II will not change the way banks evaluate the risk of lending to EMEs 
(Caruana (2005)).  
Moreover, the existence of better capitalised banks that manage and price risks more 
efficiently over an appropriate time horizon should lead to the emergence of a more stable 
and resilient financial system, therefore reducing the probability of abrupt changes in lending 
conditions. The more formal risk evaluation methodologies contained in Basel II should 
facilitate an earlier detection of inappropriate lending strategies, which should help in 
introducing corrective actions at an earlier stage, again reducing the probability of sharp 
adjustments in lending decisions (Caruana (2005)). Overall, Basel II may therefore not have 
a pronounced impact on lending flows to EMEs and may even contribute to reducing their 
volatility and procyclicality. 
Nevertheless, three features of Basel II are likely to have some bearing on the pricing or 
volume of loans to EMEs.  
First, Basel II relates the capital charges for credit risk to explicit indicators of credit quality, 
measured either externally or internally. This stands in contrast to the current framework, 
under which capital charges against sovereign and interbank loans are based on whether the 
borrower belongs to the OECD or not. The experiences of Korea, Mexico and Turkey show 
that OECD members can also be vulnerable to financial crises and the removal of this 
arbitrary distinction should lead to a more rational determination of regulatory capital. Quite 
clearly, some borrowers will gain from this transition, while others will lose. Capital charges 
on lending to countries that enjoy a relatively high credit standing will generally be reduced, 
while charges on lending to countries that are of a low credit standing will tend to rise (see 
Table 4.3). In the case of countries for which capital charges may increase, the key issue is 
whether the new minimum requirement will substantially exceed the economic capital that 
banks would otherwise hold, in which case a rise in loan pricing would likely ensue.
12
Second, Basel II may also have an impact on the maturity of loans to EMEs. Under the 
current framework, lending to non-OECD borrowers carries a full capital charge of 8% for 
loans with maturities longer than one year, compared with a charge of 1.6% for shorter-term 
claims. This preferential treatment of short-term loans is considered by some to have 
encouraged short-term lending to EMEs in the early 1990s (see the discussion in BCBS 
(1999)). Although there are some reasons for imposing a lower capital charge for short-term 
loans, the more gradual increase in the charge along the maturity spectrum contained in 
Basel II should help in reducing maturity biases in lending. 
                                                  
12  Assessing the extent to which this will be the case is not straightforward since it depends on the method used 
to calculate economic capital, the precise composition of a bank’s portfolio and a host of other competitive 
factors that determine loan pricing. 
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 Table 4.3 
Current versus new risk weights for selected sovereigns 
Risk weight (%)
1
 Rating  OECD 
Current New 
Argentina   B–    No  100  100 
Brazil   BB–    No  100  100 
Chile   A    No  100    20 
China   A–    No  100    20 
Colombia   BB    No  100  100 
Czech Republic    A–    Yes    0    20 
Greece   A    Yes    0    20 
Hungary   A–    Yes    0    20 
Indonesia   B+    No  100  100 
Israel   A–    No  100    20 
Korea   A    Yes    0    20 
Malaysia   A–    No  100    20 
Mexico   BBB    Yes    0    50 
Peru   BB    No  100  100 
Poland   BB    Yes    0  100 
Russia   BBB    No  100    50 
Singapore   AAA    No  100    0 
South Africa    BBB+    No  100    50 
Thailand   BBB+    No  100    50 
Turkey   BB–    Yes    0  100 
Venezuela   B+    No  100  100 
1  The 100% risk weighting implies a capital charge of 8%. 
Sources: Standard & Poor’s; BIS. 
 
Third, Basel II could affect the flows of credit within EMEs. The impact of the new framework 
will depend on the treatment of domestic and foreign banks located in EMEs. Many 
domestically owned banks are likely to adopt the standardised approach, under which 
minimum capital charges are unlikely to change much. Indeed, the majority of corporate 
exposures in EMEs are likely to fall into the “unrated” category, which will attract an 8% 
charge. The impact of Basel II on the local operations of foreign banks is the subject of a 
more intense debate. Foreign bank participation in certain EMEs is concentrated in a few 
internationally active banking groups, which are generally sufficiently sophisticated to adopt 
the IRB approach. One concern is that foreign banks operating on the IRB approach will 
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 enjoy a competitive advantage over domestic banks operating under the standardised 
approach. However, according to some analysts this outcome is unlikely because foreign 
banks on the IRB approach will be facing higher capital charges for low credit quality 
business than domestic banks operating on the standardised approach (Hayes and Saporta 
(2002)).
13
                                                  
13  Moreover, the adoption of the most advanced approaches will not automatically reduce capital requirements. 
In fact, the move to a closer approximation of capital requirements to actual risks could lead to an increase in 
capital requirements for banks having a higher level of credit risk than that prevailing under the Basel I 
framework. In addition, regulators will have the freedom to impose more stringent capital requirements than 
those of Basel I or Basel II. 
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